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BOOK ESSAY
"SUBSTANTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW":
A REVIEW OF RECENT TEXTSt
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY. By STEPHEN G.
BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART.** Little, Brown and Company,
1979. pp. xxxii, 1132. $25.00; THE ADMImSTRATIE PROCESS (2d
ed.). By GLEN 0. ROBINSON,*** ERNEST GELLHORN,**** & HAROLD H. BRUFF.***** West Publishing Co., 1980. pp. xxxviii,

959. $21.95.
Samuel Estreicherlf
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH AND ITS CRITICS

Administrative law continues to be treated as the law controlling

the administration, and not as law produced by the administration.
Ernst Freund, 19281
From the start, administrative law has been three parts constitutional law (initially separation of powers concerns and increasingly due process issues) and four parts judicial review. Its focal
point has been not the process of administration per se or the authority of the executive generally, 2 but the administrative agency
-an
engine of twentieth-century regulatory government often
exercising an amalgam of the traditionally separated powers of
f Copyright 0 1980 by Samuel Estreicher.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
** Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
* John C. Stennis Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
*
T. Munford Boyd Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
***** Professor of Law, Arizona State University.
Sf Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. A.B., 1970,
Columbia College; M.S., 1974, Cornell University; J.D., 1975, Columbia University.
Member, New York and District of Columbia Bars.
1. E. FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW v (2d ed. 1928).
2. For a comparison between administrative law and public administration, see
J. DAVISON & N. GRUNDSTEIN, CASES AND READINGS ON ADmINISTRATIVE LAW vivii (1952).
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rulemaking, adjudication, and administration. Responsive to the
objections, constitutional and otherwise, raised by opponents of the
administrative agency, 3 administrative law has traditionally been a
course in the legitimacy of the agency and the integrity of external
controls, largely judicial, on the exercise of administrative discretion. 4 With the emerging constitutional acceptance of the administrative agency during the New Deal period, modern casebooks--first Walter Gellhorn's in 19405 and then Louis Jaffe's in
19536-enlarged the focus to include a fairly systematic treatment
of the major procedural issues involved in rulemaking, adjudication, and other aspects of the "administrative process." In the
hands of Gellhorn and Jaffe, the field was liberated from its obsession with questions of "legitimacy." 7 But the approach remained
one of attempting to develop general principles of administrative
law, cutting across particular statutory schemes and regulatory environments, which were capable of enforcement in the courts. The
conclusion reached by Ernst Freund8 retains much of its force to
this day.
The durability of this traditional method of teaching and thinking about administrative law may be attributed to several factors.
First, questions concerning the legitimacy of administrative power,
the ability of courts to keep agencies within their legislative mandate, and the equity of procedure necessarily lie at the forefront of
any basic course in the area. 9 Second, the traditional approach mirrors the vision of both the federal Administrative Procedure Act
3. For an instructive account, see Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 261-79 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition:A Discipline in Search of
an OrganizingPrinciple, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 120, 121-27 (1977).
5. W. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1940).
6. L. JAFFE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1953).

7. The theme of crisis and legitimacy is a recurring one in this field, see J.
FREEDMAN, CRisis AND LEGITIMACY 3-12 (1978), although Gellhorn and Jaffe are re-

sponsible for shifting the focus of the administrative law text to questions of administrative procedure and process.
8. See note 1 supra and accompanying text (administrative law as "a course on
the exercise of administrative power and its subjection or non-subjection to judicial
control").
9. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 7 passim. For example, at a time when many
observers thought the delegation doctrine had been relegated to the status of mere
hortatory principle, Justice Rehnquist opened up the possibility that the Court may
"once more take up its burden of ensuring that Congress does not unnecessarily delegate important choices of social policy to politically unresponsive administrators."
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2886 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted).
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(APA)i ° and Supreme Court opinions that there are general principles of administrative law presumptively applicable to all agencies.
As Jaffe wrote in 1953:
[I]t is clear to the courts there is an abstract, general "administrative law." The doctrines of delegation of power, primary jurisdiction, exhaustion of remedies, and substantial evidence are not
completely explained by or restricted to the occasions that first
gave them birth. . . .There is a differentiated "universe of discourse" relating to administrative agencies as such."
Even if courts were less inclined to generalize about administrative
law, there remains the point made by Walter Gellhorn and his colleagues Clark Byse and Peter Strauss that "[i]f general rules applicable to the behavior of the thousands of diverse instruments of
government did not exist, surely judges and lawyers would be
obliged to invent them, to assure the possibility of control and
avoid undue specialization."' 2 Third, focusing on the process of
administrative government writ large distinguishes the administrative law course from the panoply of substantive courses in
regulatory law offered in the modern law school curriculum. The
raison d'8tre of the course is that it permits a comparativist perspective: the effort "is to facilitate identification of resemblances as
well as of differences, in the hope that capacity to make predictive judgments about administrative and judicial behavior will
thus be enhanced."' 3 Finally, the course materials, principally appellate court decisions, are amenable to "case method" treatment
in class, offering a body of knowledge and a menu of issues capable
4
of reasonable mastery in the traditional one-semester course.'
The traditional approach has not been without its critics, and,
in the writings of Howard Westwood, i 5 Robert Rabin,' 6 and Glen
10.
11.
12.

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
L. JAFFE, supra note 6, at v-vi (emphasis in original).
NV. GELLHORN, C. BYsE & P. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 2 (7th ed.

1979).
13.

W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW ix (4th ed. 1960).

14. See Rabin, supra note 4, at 126 ("Each of the three major themes-delegation of legislative power, adequacy of formal agency procedures and scope of judicial review-involves judge-made law developed largely through appellate court
opinions defining doctrine and establishing a tolerably cohesive body of legal principles.").
15. See Westwood, The Davis Treatise: Meaning to the Practitioner,43 MINN.
L. REv. 607 (1959).
16.

See Rabin, supra note 4. See also R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMIN-

ISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-14 (1979).
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Robinson and Ernest Gellhorn,1 7 the criticism has reached a level
of considerable persuasiveness.' 8 These commentators question the
vision of divorcing administrative law from the bodies of substantive law for which particular agencies are responsible.
These critics have exposed a problem familiar to all who teach
in the area. We start each term hoping that what is the basic offering in the law of modern government will spark interest among
public law-minded students. Yet our expectations are often dashed;
the course simply fails to "grab them." This is in part because of
the ethereal, abstract quality of the appellate decisions that are the
stuff of the traditional text.19 This failure of enthusiasm may simply
be endemic to all procedure courses, and perhaps all that can be
done is to make the abstractions somewhat more concrete through
20
supplementary materials.
The critique mounted by Westwood and Professors Rabin
and Robinson and Gellhorn, however, transcends considerations of
effective pedagogy. The argument is that administrative law differs
from, say, civil procedure in important respects which doom any
attempt to develop similar general principles in advance of student
mastery of the substantive law. "There is no one administrative
process," 21 write Glen Robinson and Ernest Gellhorn; "[t]here are,
in fact, as many different administrative processes as there are separate, distinct agencies or systems." 22 Each agency is a creature of
its organic statute, of the perceived evils that led to its creation,
17. See G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS X-XV
(1974); G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

(2d ed. 1980); Gellhorn & Robinson; Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75

COLUM. L. REv. 771 (1975); Gellhorn, Book Review, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1384 (1980).
18. See generally S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY xxix (1979).

19. For complaints by teachers of administrative law, see, e.g., Botein, Simulation and Roleplaying in Administrative Law, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 234 (1974); Miller,
Prolegomenon to a Modernized Study of Administrative Law, 12 J.LEGAL EDuc. 33
(1959).
20.

This is not to say that an understanding of some of the classic "puzzles" of

civil procedure, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Shields v. Barrow, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 129 (1854), might not be enhanced by an appreciation of the underly-

ing substantive law context, or that some procedural rules ought not to be wedded
quite explicitly to substantive law concerns. See, e.g., Berry, Ending Substantive's In-

denture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class
Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 299 (1980); Larrabee, Substantive Policies and
ProceduralDecisions: An Approach to Certifying Rule 23(b)(3) Antitrust Class Actions, 31 HASTINGS L. REV. 491 (1979).
21. G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, supra note 17, at xi.
22. Id.
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and of particular practical constraints-whether flowing from the
quality of its personnel, patterns of interaction with the legislature,
executive, or court, or from the relationships developed with the
regulated industry or other pressure groups. The "character of the
administrative process ...

is much more the product of the partic-

23
ular administrative functions served than is civil procedure."
Westwood's influential 1958 review adds a practitioner's perspective: Both practitioner and agency pay little attention to
decisional developments in other agencies, and indeed "even the
agency directly involved in an appellate case often is not drastically
affected thereby" and simply adjusts to the court's directive by
24
changing the form, not the substance, of what it had been doing.
Westwood's recommendation is "that there should be no single
body of administrative doctrine and that for each agency (or type of
agency) there can be its own set of principles which should be rec25
ognized by appellate courts."
Dissatisfaction with the traditional approach among law
teachers falls considerably short of endorsing Westwood's call for
an end to administrative law as such, and the substitution of "practice and procedure" courses in the particular substantive law areas.
While they perhaps favor such courses and would encourage
teachers in the substantive areas to highlight administrative procedure and process concerns, advocates of "substantive administrative
law" agree that the basic survey course still plays a distinctive

role. 2 6 Robinson and Ernest Gelihorn, for example, concede:

"[A]dministrative problems do recur; the experience developed in
one agency is often applicable to another; the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act apply to many, and the commands of
the Constitution 'apply to all. Moreover, the teacher's function is
one of synthesis as well as of challenge."27 But what is needed,
they argue, is a course that weds substance to procedure so as to
make the subject intelligible to the student, reflect the underlying
reality of the administrative process, and provide a basis for meaningful synthesis and comparativism in the field.
23. Id. at xii.
24. Westwood, supra note 15, at 609.
25. Id. at 612.
26. Although a good part of Professor Rabin's insightful critique of traditional
approaches in the field concerns an agenda for research, he also calls for an integration of substantive and procedural law in the basic course. See Rabin, supra note 4,
at 144.
27. G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, supra note 17, at xi.
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It is not a new insight that an understanding of traditional
administrative law concerns may be enhanced by study of the underlying substantive law and regulatory context. In words that

could as easily have been written by Robinson and Gellhorn, Professors Felix Frankfurter and J. Forrester Davison made much the
same point in their pathbreaking 1931 text:
Administrative Law is markedly influenced by the specific interests entrusted to a particular administrative organ, as well as
by the characteristics-history, structure and enveloping environment-of the particular organ of regulation ....

[T]he problems

subsumed by "judicial reviev" or "administrative discretion"
must be dealt with organically; they must be related to the implications of the particular interests that invoke a "judicial review," or as to which "administrative discretion" is exercised. In
short, for the scientific development of Administrative Law a
subject like "judicial review" must be studied not only horizontally but vertically; we must explore not "judicial review" generally or miscellaneously, but "judicial review" of utility regulation, "judicial review" of Federal Trade Commission orders,
"judicial review" of postal fraud orders, "judicial review" of deportation orders. "Judicial review" in Federal Trade Commission
cases, for instance, is affected by totally different assumptions,
conscious and unconscious, from those which govern courts
when reviewing orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Likewise "judicial review' in postal cases is under the sway of
the whole structure of which it forms a part, just as "judicial review" in land office cases or in immigration cases derives significance from the agency which is reviewed 28no less than from the
nature of the subject matter under review.
The Frankfurter and Davison text organized the judicial-review

materials into substantive law categories. A similar organization was
later followed by Maurer,2

9

Stason, 30 Sears, 3 1 and Katz.3 2 These

28. F. FRANKFURTER & J. DAVISON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW viii (1932). Frankfurter also directed the Commonwealth
Fund Studies of Administrative Law, which yielded Gerard Henderson's highly regarded report on the FTC, G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

(1924).
29.

See R.

MAURER, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

chs. 9-14 (1937).
30.
(1937);
(3d ed.
31.

See E. STASON, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS vii, ch. 10
E. STASON & F. COOPER, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIvE TRIBUNALS ch. 8
1956).
See K. SEARS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW viii, ch. 3

(1938).
32. See M.

KATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss1/9
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were nascent efforts, but they apparently failed to win general acceptance among law teachers. The reasons are obscure. Perhaps

what was needed was a figure of the intellectual range and perspective of a Frankfurter who left the field in 1939 for the Supreme
Court. Perhaps the achievement of the APA in 1946,33 which presented a fairly unitary model of administrative procedure,3 4 as well
as the continuing quest to improve regulatory government through
procedural reform,3 5 irresistibly influenced the traditional text's

format and content. Perhaps the commercial success of Gellhorn
and Byse 36 or Jaffe and Nathanson 3 7 eclipsed efforts to develop
alternatives. The explanation may, however, lie elsewhere-in the
pedagogical desirability of imparting an overview to students taking
a survey course in administrative law.
In recent years, criticism of the traditional approach has

yielded alternative texts.38 One, authored by Harvard Professors
Stephen Breyer and Richard Stewart,3 9 offers an intermediate
alternative: It retains much of the structure of the traditional text
while interlacing conventional materials with court decisions and
textual notes highlighting the substantive dimension of the issues
considered. Another, authored by Virginia Professors Robinson and

Gellhorn and Arizona Professor Harold Bruff,4 0 departs significantly from the traditional text: It organizes the materials along
functional and subject matter lines, supplementing the presentation

of essentially substantive law issues with materials that develop
considerations of process. These texts mark a major advance in
33. Ch. 423, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706
(1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
34. The APA was considerably more flexible than the Walter-Logan bill, S. 915,
H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 CONG. REC. 668, 5561 (1939) (introduced), which
President Roosevelt had vetoed, 86 CONG. REC. 13,943 (1940) (veto message of the
President), as its formal-hearing provisions must be triggered by organic agency legislation, but it did give rise to a unitary model of administrative procedure in the
sense of a general procedural format for the great variety of statutory schemes. See
generally Verkuil, supra note 3, at 268-78.
35. For current proposals, see G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra
note 17, at 865-81.
36. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (6th ed. 1974).
37. See L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (4th ed. 1976).
38. This essay does not discuss H. LINDE & G. BUNN, LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES (1976), and J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION
TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM (1975), because they are designed primarily
for first-year students. One chapter of J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, supra, attempts an

integration of substance and procedure. See id., ch. 7.
39. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 18.
40. G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note 17.
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thinking about administrative law teaching. They offer much which is
useful to the teacher and student. But at the same time they pose
a danger that increased appreciation of substantive context may
have been purchased at the loss of the general perspective that was
the principal virtue of the traditional approach. The question is
whether that price is too high to pay in a basic course.
BREYER AND STEWART: AN INTERMEDIATE ALTERNATIVE
Breyer and Stewart's text 41 opens with an endorsement

of
Rabin's
that the traditional course is too abstract and
gives a misleading, incomplete picture of the texture of administrative law, the efficacy of judicial review, and the actual impact of
administrative action. 4a Their stated goal, however, is modest: "to
preserve the essential virtues of the traditional course while
adapting it to meet these objections." 44 In addition to material organized along traditional procedural lines, "the book uses notes and
problems systematically to survey regulation, [to] sho[w] the interaction between substance and procedure, and [to] describ[e]
45
some of the bureaucratic and political factors at work."
The book is modeled in part after the Jaffe and Nathanson
46
text -indeed, it is dedicated to Louis Jaffe. For instance, the second chapter of Jaffe and Nathanson's "Administrative Discretion in
Formulating Policy" was a novel attempt to convey the texture of
agency-policy formation and the importance to that process of the
choice between rulemaking and adjudication. The materials occasionally followed the full course of a litigation-from agency proposal to agency action, judicial decision, and agency decision on
remand 4 -- describing in vivid fashion the pattern of agency response to court intervention. Not surprisingly, Breyer and Stewart
48
adopt a similar treatment of such matters.
The book has several strengths that distinguish it from earlier
texts. It includes materials on regulation, including a survey of
critique 42

41. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 18.
42. R. RABIN, supra note 16, at 7-14.
43. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 18, at xxix.
44. Id.

45. Id.
46. See L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, supra note 37.
47. E.g., id. at 182-207 (the Federal Power Commission and its regulation of in-

dependent, natural-gas producers).
48. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 18, at 332-50, 398-444.
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323

classical regulatory tools and market-based alternatives, 49 and a
rather lucid account of the ratesetting process, 50 providing an enlightening introduction to basic issues in regulatory policy.
Secondly, the authors' comprehensive analytical treatment of
doctrines of judicial intervention imparts to the student a "feel" for
the underlying substantive context. Thus, for example, material on
the delegation doctrine includes excerpts from economists
Galbraith 51 and Friedman, 52 the text of the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970,53 and the House committee report 4 and executive
order 55-all as a prelude to understanding Judge Leventhal's important opinion on the subject in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Connally.56 Similarly, the treatment of the "hard look" or "serious
57
consideration" doctrine, also attributable to Judge Leventhal,
raises questions about the danger of disguised-value imposition
through nominally procedural review. 58 Particularly successful sections in this vein are those addressing the Ashbacker Radio Corp.
v. FCC 59 requirement of comparative hearings in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensure, which highlights serious
policy questions about the utility of judicial control and the wisdom
of a scheme of agency allocation of valuable, exclusive licenses under a "public interest" standard; 60 examining the phenomenon of
judicially imposed "hybrid" procedures in informal rulemaking61
49.

Id. at 8-19, 130-61. See generally Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:

Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REv. 549 (1979).
50.

S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 18, at 200-26, 421-44.

51. Id. at 68-70 (reprinting in part To Extend the Defense Production Act of
1950, as Amended: Hearings on H.R. 17880 Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 6-10 (1970) (statement of John K. Galbraith)).
52. Id. at 71-73 (reprinting in part Friedman, What Price Guideposts?, in
GUIDELINES, INFORMAL CONTROLS, AND THE MARKETPLACE 17, 31-34, 36 (G.
Shultz & R. Aliber eds. 1966)).
53. Id. at 73-74 (reprinting §§ 201-206, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976)).
54. Id. at 74-75 (reprinting in part H.R. REP. No. 1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
9-11 (1970)).
55. Id. at 75-77 (reprinting Executive Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727
(1971)).
56. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge court).
57. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). See generally Estreicher, PragmaticJustice:
The Contributionsof Judge Harold Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 CoLUM. L.
REv. 894, 903-07, 924-26 (1980).
58. See S. BREYER & R.STEWART, supra note 18, at 299-309.
59. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
60. S.BREYER & R. STEWNART, supra note 18, at 359-97.
61. Id. at 499-511.
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and its denouement in the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. National Resources Defense Council62 litigation; and presenting
63
developments in "public interest" representation.
A third distinctive feature of the Breyer-Stewart text is its periodic attempts to integrate substance and procedure. Sections on
FCC allocation of licenses "in the public interest," 64 Federal
Power Commission areawide ratemaking and the problem of "rent
control," 65 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation of
66
drug efficacy and the use of summary adjudicatory procedures,
and Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulation of airline rates and
the effect of adjudicatory procedure in exacerbating a preexisting
problem of counterproductive regulatory policy 67 provide heartening examples of successful integration in a text organized along
traditional lines. A separate chapter is devoted to a single agency,
exploring the problems arising from the combination of functions in
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the utility of efforts to
reform the agency through personnel and structural changes, and
revitalize it through a regulatory initiative against false advertising. 6 8
Nevertheless, despite its strengths, the book is not without
drawbacks; they are primarily problems of organization and emphasis. The APA receives no sustained treatment until after the authors' consideration of many of the important doctrines of judicial
control. Thus, the relationship between the APA and principles of
judicial review is not developed in a clear, systematic fashion.
Moreover, space devoted to substantive law issues often takes its
toll in compression of traditional procedural materials. A chapter
entitled "Hearing Requirements in Economic Regulation and Taxation" 69 tries to do too much-embracing due process standards,
"hybrid" rulemaking, scope of review of agency factfinding in
rulemaking, APA requirements and judicial review in informal adjudication, ex parte contracts, and the interaction between proce-

62.

435 U.S. 519 (1978), rev'g 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

63.

S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 18, at 1013-58. See generally Stewart,

The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
64. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 18, at 359-97.
65. Id. at 421-45.
66. Id. at 557-68.
67. Id. at 568-92.
68. Id., ch. 8.
69. Id., ch. 6.
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dural rules and the regulatory policies of the FDA and CAB. One
might also question the appropriateness of a few of the digressions
70
into substantive law. For example, a discussion of rate structure,
curiously divorced from an earlier treatment of cost-of-service
discussion
ratemaking, 71 seems to be a distracting introduction to a 72
regulations.
applying
in
consistency
of
of the requirement
There are also some significant omissions. There is no systematic treatment of informal agency action, prosecutorial discretion,
or other aspects of discretionary jurisdiction, 73 although sections
such as the textual note 74 on the special issues raised by the Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., v. Volpe 75 ruling, and isolated
discussions of Professor Davis' work on discretionary justice, 76 and
the problem of inaction in the context of public intervention in
agency proceedings 77 provide a pastiche of relevant material. One
might also wish for a fuller consideration of legislative and execu78
tive controls on administration.
These critical observations do not detract from the advantages
of the Breyer-Stewart volume over the traditional text. Admittedly,
the authors attempt only a partial integration of substance and procedure and have been criticized for less than total commitment to
the revisionist critique, 79 but it is this moderate approach which
permits incorporation of traditional materials within a generally
procedural format, and contributes to a very strong basic text.

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 445-50.
Id. at 200-26.
Id. at 450-58.
In this regard, compare S.

BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 18, with
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 440-534 (6th ed. 1977) and L. JAFFE & N.
NATHANSON, supra note 37, at 376-417.

74. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 18, at 524-30.
75. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
76. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 18, at 321-26 (reprinting in part 1 K.
DAVIS, ADIMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 208-15 (2d ed. 1978); quoting K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE SEVENTIES 116 (1976), and K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY

JUSTICE 99 (1969); and citing K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975)).

77. Id. at 1030-40.
78. Id. at 93-102, 144-59.
79. See Gellhorn, Book Review, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1384, 1394 (1980):
As evidenced by their attempt, a successfully integrated text generally must
first examine substantive regulatory policies, and only then explore procedural law, which is the handmaiden of those policies. Breyer and Stewart, it
seems to me, have turned this organizational scheme on its head, and by
emphasizing procedural over substantive law have failed to forge the
organizational link so essential to an integrated administrative law textbook.
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FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

Robinson and Gellhorn are leading advocates of a substantive
approach to administrative law. In a second edition80 to a casebook originally published in 1974,81 they have joined with Professor Bruff to produce a text unique in the field. The three principal chapters-forming part II of the book, "The Government as
Regulator" 8 -- provide elaborate case studies of administrative law in
selective substantive contexts: The role of judicial review in environmental regulation, 8 3 the FCC's functions in regulating the electronic media, 8 4 and the FTC's activities as a prosecutorial agency. 8 5
Each offers an in-depth analysis of the development of regulatory
policy within the constraints imposed by substantive law, administrative procedure, and bureaucratic reality.
Here are rich resources for further study and analysis. The
treatment of The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969's
environmental impact-statement requirement8 6 in the chapter on
"Government and the Environment" suggests that impact statements do not improve agency decisions and often permit litigants
87
and courts to further substantive objections to agency projects;
these materials place in question reliance on impact statements as a
means of improving agency decisionmaking. The chapter on the
FCC examines the consequences of a broad delegation of authority
to an agency operating in a context rife with first amendment considerations (a process culminating in the accretion of jurisdiction
over cable television), and offers a useful basis "for comparison
with the [relatively] more confined discretion of the Environmental
Protection Agency." 8 8 The chapter on the FTC develops several

80.
81.

G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN, & H. BRUFF, supra note 17.
G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, supra note 17.

82. The first part of the book offers conventional introductory material. The
third part, "Government and the Individual: Rights and Freedoms in the Welfare
State," presents the "due process revolution" in the contexts of occupational
licensing, public employment, welfare administration, and educational administration. The concluding part treats current proposals for regulatory reform.
83. G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note 17, ch. 3.
84. Id., ch. 4

85. Id., ch. 5.
86. § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
87. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note 17, at 141-69.
88. Id. at xvii. This part of the book benefited greatly from Professor Robinson's distinguished service on the FCC. See generally Robinson, The Federal Com-

munications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169
(1978).
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important themes, including the constitutionality of and economic
justification for government regulation of consumer advertising, the
significance of a 1944 victory on standard of proof8 9 in expanding
the agency's regulatory reach, the issue of adverse publicity as a
technique of regulation, 9" and the impact of statutory authorization
of legislative rulemaking 9 ' on regulatory initiatives in the late
1970's. These materials are full-bodied essays that contribute significantly to understanding the regulatory process.
The question remains, however, whether Robinson, Gellhorn,
and Bruff have fashioned a successful text for use in a basic survey
course. This is difficult to answer without actual trial in the classroom, but there is a basis for concern. In order to make room for
their very rich treatment of issues of substantive policy and
regulatory context, the authors have had to compress a great deal
of the stuff of the traditional course into textual notes scattered
throughout the book. The result is a rather breezy treatment of
some very difficult, important administrative law issues. In the
third chapter, for example, thirty-five pages are devoted to the
subtopic, "Basic Issues in Administrative Policymaking and Judicial
Review" 92 --including such matters as Overton Park and the problem of informal adjudication under the APA, the function of administrative findings and reasons in both formal (on-the-record) and
informal proceedings, inquiry into the administrator's internal decisional processes, the concept of a "record" in informal proceedings, the scope of review in informal adjudication, on-the-record
adjudication and informal rulemaking, and the vision of agencycourt partnership developed in Judge Leventhal's decision for the
D.C. Circuit in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC.93 Cer-

tainly these issues are present in Overton Park and judicial review
of environmental law generally, but one must question the wisdom
of treating them so cursorily and all at once.
Similarly, in the context of judicial review of scientific
decisionmaking, 94 the authors offer an excerpt from the Supreme
Court's decision in Vermont Yankee, which, while involving review
89. See Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (1944).
90. See generally Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1380 (1973).
91. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act § 202(a), 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976).
92. G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note 17, at 116-41.
93. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
94.

G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note 17, at 195-207.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1980

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:315

of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing proceeding, was
principally concerned with the reviewing court's common law authority to require "hybrid" procedures in informal rulemaking.
Vermont Yankee is not obviously pertinent to what precedes it in
the text, and, moreover, the authors simply fail to give a full account of the context-increased agency reliance on rulemaking,
pre-enforcement judicial review of rules, and the difficulties of
review in the absence of a well-defined record-leading to the
phenomenon of hybrid rulemaking. 95
In addition to this tendency toward undue compression of
complex issues, 96 the authors are often compelled arbitrarily to insert seemingly unrelated material into the functional chapters.
Thus, a section on judicial techniques for avoiding decision on the
merits97 is sandwiched between Vermont Yankee and an "excursus"
on federal lands and wilderness policy. Similarly, a quick tour
through various statutes providing for public access to government
information and those suggesting limits on disclosure of sensitive

information held by the government9 8 is out of place and distracting in a chapter on the FTC.
This impressive volume then, despite its major contribution to
the field, leaves one uneasy and concerned that perhaps the general has been sacrificed on the altar of the particular. Students will
have a deeper appreciation of the regulatory environments confronting the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the FCC,
and the FTC, and may gain a heightened sensitivity to the problem of delegation of legislative authority; nevertheless, they may
lack a sufficient general understanding of the panoply of issues in
the area and of the range of procedural options available to the
administrative process.

95. See Auerbach, Informal Rule Making: A Proposed Relationship Between
Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 15 (1977);
Estreicher, supra note 57, at 912-13, 914-17; Nathanson, Probingthe Mind of the Administrator:Hearing Variationsand Standards of JudicialReview Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 721 (1975);
Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory Misinterpretation,16 SAN DiEcO L. REV. 183 (1979); Scalia, Vermont Yankee:
The APA, the D.C. Circuit,and the Supreme Court, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 345.
96. Perhaps the treatment that leaves the reader most breathless is the
discussion of the tort liability of public employees. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN
& H. BRUFF, supra note 17, at 699-721.
97. Id. at 207-56.
98. Id. at 504-39.
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SUPPLEMENTING THE TRADITIONAL TExT: A MODEST AGENDA

The texts reviewed here demonstrate that significant improvements upon the traditional approach are possible. Those teachers
who are dissatisfied with the course as conventionally taught but
unwilling to abandon the traditional text may wish to consider a
strategy of supplementing the traditional text; the following offers
some suggestions in this regard.
First, an understanding of history is essential if one is to evaluate present and future developments. For example, consideration
of the Bumpers bill, 9 9 providing for an end to judicial deference to
administrative expertise, might well benefit from a reading of the
history leading to the creation of administrative agencies and the
attempts to hamstring the administrative process through undue
judicialization.' 0 0 History also provides a useful perspective on the

debate sparked by J. Skelly Wright, 10 John Hart Ely, 102 William
Rehnquist, 10 3 and others calling for a return to active judicial im-

plementation of the delegation doctrine. Similarly, the history of
the enactment of the APA would illuminate the issues considered
1 04
in Overton Park, United States v. Florida East Coast Railway1 05
and Vermont Yankee. For example, as Professors Nathanson,

Auerbach, 106 and Scalia' 0 7 have suggested, the campaign to impose
hybrid procedures on informal rulemaking may well have been a
judicial response to a review role representing a fundamental alteration in the compromise embodied in the APA.

Second, the network of legislative and executive controls on
administrative action is a subject treated only summarily in all texts
in the field. This has the effect of magnifying the importance of ju-

dicial review, and contributing to an overly abstract class discussion
of the major issues. The problem of delegation of legislative author-

99.

S. 111, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S373 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1979),

summarized in DIGEST OF PUBLIC GENERAL BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. A-18 (1979). For a critical appraisal, see Woodward & Levin, In Defense of
Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 AD. L. REv. 329 (1979).
100. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 3, at 261-79.
101. See Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972).
102. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 133 (1980).
103. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844,
2885-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
105. See Nathanson, supra note 95; Nathanson, supra note 95.
106. See Auerbach, supra note 95.
107. See Scalia, supra note 95.
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ity, for example, ought not to be discussed without evaluating the
effectiveness of controls emanating from the politically accountable
branches. 08s The debate over the one-house legislative veto or
presidential control over administrative agencies requires some understanding of the practical implications, 10 9 including the extent of
staff influence in congressional committees or in the Office of Management and Budget in implementing such controls."10 The issue
of presidential intervention in rulemaking, illuminated by the suggestion of Professors Bruff"i and Strauss"12 that the President has
considerable residual authority over policymaking by independent
agencies as well as executive departments, warrants a fuller treatment of executive controls than is given in traditional texts.
Third, case studies are an important feature of the new
casebooks, and suggest a useful device for supplementing traditional texts. Published research on the administrative process offers
a rich vein of material in which to ground discussion of many important issues in the area. Examples include Professor Boyer's recent study"13 of hybrid rulemaking under the Magnuson-Moss
Act, 1 4 Professor Asimow's study on separation of functions even in
agencies not subject to the APA compulsion," 5 Professor Strauss'
study of the choice between rulemaking and adjudication in the
federal mining bureau," 6 Professor Williams' study of remand proceedings in hybrid rulemaking cases, 117 and William Pedersen's
108. Professor Robinson's essay on the FCC offers such a perspective. See
Robinson, supra note 88, at 196-212.
109. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369, 1417-20 (1977) (legislative veto enhances the power of congressional committees rather than Congress as
a whole).
110.

See generally M. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES (1979).

111. See Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE
L.J. 451, 489-91, 498-99 (1979).
112. See Address by P. Strauss, Presidential Authority Over Regulatory Decisions, before the Conf. on the President's Role in Regulatory Policy of the Center for
Law and Econ. Stud. of Colum. U., in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 23, 1980).

113. TRADE REGULATION RULEMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COaMISSION, REPORT TO THE ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES (1979).
114. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
§ 202(a), 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976).
115. Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in Federal
Administrative Agencies, 80 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming, 1980).
116. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive
Department: Reflections on the Interior Department'sAdministration of the Mining
Law, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1231 (1974).
117. Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative ProcedureAct:
A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401 (1975).
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study of the process of "record"-creation in informal rulemaking
and of the effect of D.C. Circuit rulings on the quality of EPA
decisionmaking. 118 These are but a few of the riches found in the
accumulated work product of the Administrative Conference"19 and
secondary literature.
The case-study approach might also include an in-depth account of the workings of one or two agencies selected for particular
characteristics. Breyer and Stewart's chapter on the FTC120 or
Robinson, Gellhorn, and Bruff's chapters on environmental law,
FCC licensure, or FTC prosecutorial regulation 1 21 would serve this
purpose. I intend in my course to focus on the National Labor Relations Board, as an example of an independent agency that makes
policy through adjudication, and on the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) of the Department of Labor, as an
example of an executive agency that makes policy through informal
rulemaking with adjudication assigned to an independent commission. Both agencies implement substantive labor law122 and also
face relatively inhospitable reception in the courts and Congress;
they provide an occasion for studying the significance of environmental factors to the implementation of regulatory agenda.
Fourth, a related point is the desirability of concretization. A
discussion of the role of cross-examination, whether in informal
rulemaking or disability-termination proceedings, requires some
understanding of what the process looks like in particular proceedings. The Williams study 2 3 as well as Professor Mashaw's writ118.

Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38

(1975).
119. The Administrative Conference of the United States "stud[ies] the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative procedure[sJ used by administrative agencies in carrying out administrative programs, and make[s] recommendations
[for improvements] to administrative agencies, collectively or individually, and to
the President, Congress, or the Judicial Conference of the United States.
5
U.S.C. § 574(1) (1976).
But see Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 CoLULM.
L. REv. 771, 794 (1975); Robinson, The Administrative Conference and Administrative Law Scholarship, 26 AD. L. REv. 269 (1974) (critical of the Administrative Conference's failure to subject the administrative process to a systematic analysis).
120. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 82-91 supra and accompanying text.
122. My intention is to attempt to implement Professor Rabin's suggestion that
"[t~he most promising means" of relating substance to procedure without subordinating the latter to the former "would be to choose an area of substantive policy that
is occupied by a number of agencies, thus providing a comparative basis for
analyzing agency processes." Rabin, supra note 4, at 142.
123. See Williams, supra note 117.
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ings 124 on Goldberg v. Kelly 12 5 and Mathews v. Eldridge126 can be
of considerable help here. Similarly, the theoretical distinction between "legislative fact" and "adjudicative fact" has to be brought
down to earth, and one suggestion is focusing on the role of predictive rules in agency-policy formation and the nature of the justification for such predictions. Examination of OSHA's cancer principles 1 27 or a study along the lines of Getman, Goldberg, and
Herman's critique of NLRB predictive judgments in regulating

representation elections 12 8 might enhance meaningful student consideration of these points.

Fifth, thought ought also to be given to comparative analyses,

129
such as a study of intervention in different types of agencies,

and transnational evaluations, 130 such as an inquiry into the French
13
administrative-court experience.
Sixth, there are important lacunae in traditional texts. For ex-

ample, informal action, the "lifeblood of the administrative process,"' 32 remains beyond the verge of the course called "Adminis124. See Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974); Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews
v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28
(1976). See also Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures,43 U. CHn. L.
REV. 739 (1976).
125. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
126. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
127. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Instit., 100 S. Ct. 2844
(1980); American Textile Inst., Inc. v. Marshall, Nos. 79-1429, 79-1583.
128.
TIONS

J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELEC-

(1976). See also Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Reg-

ulation: A Proposal, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1441 (1977).

129. See, e.g., MacIntyre & Volhard, Intervention in Agency Adjudications, 58
VA. L. REV. 230, 253 (1972) (intervention in FTC adjudications should follow the approach of prosecutorial agencies, such as the Justice Department in the antitrust
field, rather than agencies that regulate by supervision).
130. See B. SCHWARTZ, & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT
(1972); Wade, Anglo-American Administrative Law: Some Reflections, 81 L.Q. REV.
357 (1965).
131. A study of the French administrative court would aid consideration of the
recurrent proposals for a general administrative court in this country. See, e.g.,
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION,
A NEW
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY

AGENCIES (1971) (the Ash Council Report). See also Nathanson, Proposalsfor an
Administrative Appellate Court, 25 AD. L. REV. 85 (1973); Sullivan, Independent
Adjudication and Occupational Safety and Health Policy: A Test for Administrative
Court Theory, 31 AD. L. REv. 177 (1979).
132. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINIS-
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trative Law."' 1 3 3 Similarly, delay in administrative decisionmaking

is a recurring problem, but neglected in the conventional course.
Materials on adjudication should provide some occasion for a sys-

tematic discussion of the sources of delay, 13 4 as well as a considera-

tion of the recent movement by some courts to hasten the pro35
cess. 1
Administrative law-the law of modem government-is a subject brimming with interesting questions, but the objectives of
a survey course are necessarily modest. It is, after all, "an intro-

duction to a complex and important area of the law."'1 36 Improvements in the basic text are nevertheless long overdue. Breyer and
Stewart and Robinson, Gellhorn, and Bruff light the way, enriching
the basic course and identifying issues for further exploration.
TRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1941) ("It was, and is,

the best study of federal administrative procedure ever prepared." Verkuil, supra
note 3, at 275).
133. K. DAVIS, supra note 73, is a notable exception. For useful studies in this
area, see K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION

(1975); Abrams, Internal Policy Guiding the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1971); Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal DiscretionaryAdjudication and Enforcement, 72 CoLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1972); Vorenberg, Narrowing
the Discretionof CriminalJustice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651.
134. See generally SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON
FEDERAL REGULATION, VOL. IV, DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS, S. Doc. No.

72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Ogden, Judicial Control of Administrative Delay, 3
U. DAYTON L. REV. 345 (1978); Ogden, Reducing Administrative Delay: Timeliness
Standards,Judicial Review of Agency Procedures, Procedural Reform, and Legislative Oversight, 4 U. DAYTON L. REv. 71 (1979).
135. See, e.g., White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 908 (1978).
136. v. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra note 36, at xvii (emphasis in original).
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